I. INTRODUCTION
Religious freedom: Is it the grandparent of human rights, or the neglected stepchild? As with most false dichotomies, the answer is "both." It is the grandparent of human rights as well as the neglected stepchild. But it is also the underappreciated core and, my preferred metaphor, the taproot of human rights.
In this essay, I will discuss a deceptively simple and surprisingly controversial (even as UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Religion and Belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, put it at the symposium, "provocative") question: Why should we care about religious freedom? 1 For the seeker of religious truth, the answer may be obvious: religious freedom creates the conditions, the "constitutional space," 2 for investigation and the pursuit of truth. But what about those who fall into other groups? What about the religiously committed-those who are confident they are already in possession of religious truth? Or the religiously indifferent-those who are not much interested in religion or spirituality? Or those who are affirmatively hostile to religion-those who believe religion does more harm than good? Should they-should we-care about religious freedom?
I would like to provide three reasons for suggesting that theyand all of us-should care deeply about freedom of religion (and belief). As I begin, I'd like to make two preliminary notes. First, the human rights documents' inclusion of "and belief" 959 formulation of the protection of freedom of religion is important, since it carves out space to protect and respect religious as well as non-religious bases for belief. In the words of the UN Human Rights Committee, it protects "theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief." 4 The second preliminary note is to acknowledge that there are many important instrumental reasons why religion and religious freedom are important. For example, one recent study estimates that religion in America contributes $1.2 trillion to the American economy-much in the form of education, health care, care of the homeless, drug and addiction counseling, marriage counseling, etc.
5
There is also evidence that religious freedom positively correlates with a number of other important social and political goods.
6 My focus is a little different-not on the good that religion does but on why we should care about religious freedom itself, or the freedom to choose religion. and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 6. See BRIAN J. GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2-3 (2011) ("[T]he higher the degree to which governments and societies ensure religious freedoms for all, the less violent religious persecution and conflict along religious lines there will be.").
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The reasons I will focus on today are these: First, religious freedom is a historical foundation for constitutional, political, civil, and human rights. I will suggest that without freedom of religion and belief ("FORB"), the entire human rights project may collapse from its own weight. Second, I will argue that FORB is necessary if we are to resist statism and other monistic views of state power. And third, I will suggest that we may not have the intellectual, political, or rhetorical resources to defend conscience if we do not respect and protect FORB.
II. HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF FORB
As a matter of history, religious freedom is a foundational human right. 7 The story of the emergence of FORB as a human right is complex. 8 Consider one aspect of that story, which involves the other important civil and political rights that we bundle together with religious freedom-freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association, among others. 9 As a matter of history, freedom of speech arose in large measure as an effort to protect religious dissenters and their right to express and advocate for their religious views. 10 As a matter of history, freedom of the press was a battle fought in large measure over the printing of the Bible. 8. See id. at 1-18. 9. For example, these freedoms all appear in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. In the 16th century, the Reformation allowed a space for dissenters to voice concerns about the dominant Catholic Church. 12 Freedom of association-closely related-includes the right to gather with those who share our beliefs and commitments, including religious communities and religiously affiliated institutions such as schools and universities.
13
Even non-discrimination norms (which these days are often conceptualized as being in tension with FORB) arose in large measure as efforts to stamp out religious discrimination-for example, discrimination against Catholics and Jews in the United States.
14 The non-discrimination provisions of international human ] jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status"); Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance, supra note 3 (discussing how the document was drafted to further the goal of the United Nations to "promote and encourage universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion").
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This is my question: Can we expect the leaves and branches to thrive, or even survive, if the roots are cut? At the symposium at which his essay was delivered, Simon McCrosson described what he called "cut-flower" culture-enjoying something beautiful, after cutting it from its roots, without recognizing that cut flowers are destined to fade, wither, and soon die. 25 Such are the consequences of cutting the taproots of freedom, of severing our freedoms from their moral roots or sources of sustenance.
Let us reflect upon the controversy over the presence of the crucifix in public schools in Italy. From an American perspective, such a display would clearly violate the Establishment Clause. But let us reflect upon the surprising strength of the Italian position. The argument, most clearly articulated in lower court opinions in Italy, is that Catholic doctrine (concerning the dignity of man) and Catholic culture (with its commitment to equality) created the conditions in which human rights could be recognized, embraced, and given legal protection. 26 Thus, the crucifix is a symbol of the religious doctrine and culture that cultivated the soil out of which human rights could grow in Italy and perhaps beyond. According to this argument, to prohibit the crucifix is not only to forget or reject that history but also to commit a kind of tragic patricide-children exiling a parent in the name of the very rights that parent gave them.
A popular argument these days is that FORB is an unnecessary or redundant human right since much of what is protected by FORB would be protected by freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association.
27 So, the argument goes, if we imagine rights as a kind of bundle, then perhaps removing one stick (FORB) will not materially weaken the strength of the bundle.
But I think we must concede that religious claims are among the most heartfelt and most morally serious claims made by human beings, since they not only appeal to deeply-held conscientious beliefs, but also often appeal to what people believe God asks or demands of them. If we are unwilling to protect religious speech, should we expect other types of speech to be protected, types of speech that may be less central to human identity and meaning? If we are unwilling to protect the freedom of the press for religious speech, should we expect other types of publications to be given robust protection? If freedom of association is denied for the religious, can we expect other types of association to be given legal protection?
I believe these questions answer themselves-if we are unwilling to protect religious freedom, which lies at the core of human identity and meaning, then we should not expect our political, legal, and social institutions to protect other important civil and political rights.
III. RESISTING STATISM
My second answer to the question, why religious freedom, concerns marshaling intellectual and cultural resources to resist statism.
I have recently become concerned that we are presently in the midst of a larger conflict than we often recognize. What I have in mind is a world-defining struggle between two dramatically different visions of the state and its relationship with its people.
The contest is between what I will call monism (which is inclined towards various types of statism) and dualism, the idea that the state's domain over our lives is in some important way subject to limits that lie outside and beyond the state itself. 
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Dualism is an old idea, found in Jesus Christ's answer to the lawyer who asked whether it was lawful to pay taxes. Jesus's response expresses a worldview that was already normatively powerful, yet also disruptive, two thousand years ago.
As recorded in the Gospel of Mark: "[T]hey brought [a coin]. And he saith unto them, Whose is this image and superscription? And they said unto him, Caesar's. And Jesus answering said unto them, render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's. And they marveled at him." 29 This reflects what I am calling dualism-the idea that there are certain claims that Caesar, or state authority, makes upon us; and other claims that God, or divine authority, makes upon us.
Today the key characteristics of a dualist understanding of the state are that the state is justified in large measure by its success in protecting individual liberty, that government is subject to specific limitations, and that the rule of law prevails.
30

A. Dualism vs. Monism
Political systems can be founded on either dualist or monist understandings of the scope of the state's power, jurisdiction, and authority.
In the fourth century, for example, there was a world-defining struggle between the Roman Empire and emergent Christianity. For the Romans, Caesar was a god, so there was no dualism between the things that were Caesar's and the things that were God's. But since the fourth century, in Europe at any rate, this dualism has persisted.
To be sure, when we posit dualism, we do not have the answers to all our questions, but we focus on what the questions are-what are the proper boundaries between religion and the state; between 29. Mark 12:16-17 (King James). 30. The Declaration of Independence, for example, explicitly states that "Governments are instituted among Men" only to secure unalienable rights, and "[t]hat whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 23 (2016) (arguing that the inclusion of the word "just" in the Declaration of Independence's discussion of governmental power implies that the "lawmaking power must itself be limited by law" to only those powers that will secure the rights that predated the formation of government).
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conscience and state power; between individuals' inalienable rights and the legislative and regulatory demands of the state?
Answering the questions will require ongoing navigation-but one answer is off the table, and it is the statist answer found in statists of all varieties, be they religious or secular, that there are no limits on the state's power or jurisdiction and that rights are just gifts bestowed by the state upon individuals, gifts that can be taken as well as given.
Indeed, to a significant extent, the human rights project at the end of World War II that culminated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was a reaction to the strong state monism of the Nazi regime, under which state power trumped conscience and the government invoked emergency powers to overcome claims to political and civil rights. 31 The preamble of the UDHR begins, "Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." 32 This initial recognition reflects the dualist intuition that there are interests weighty enough to constitute inalienable rights-things the state is obliged to respect and protect.
And then in a passage that must be read against the vivid memory of Nazi and Japanese imperialist atrocities, the preamble to the UDHR continues, "Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind." 33 In these words we hear an echo of the conviction awakened by World War II: "[N]ever again"! 34
The UDHR then declares in Article 1: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
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Note that this declaration posits a dualism that places limits on the state's authority. Human rights are asserted to be things with which all people are born, endowments based upon our human characteristics of reason and conscience, as well as our capacity to have genuine regard for each other.
I suggest that the unease many feel toward human rights is based upon an erosion of the strong commitment to dualism that underlies not just the human rights worldview, but most of Western history.
B. Historical Development and Manifestations of Dualism
This dualism is present in many forms and has undergone many instantiations.
We find an early fifth-century Augustinian version of it: the Church as a spiritual City of God in contrast to the material Earthly City. 36 Augustine argued that, although Christianity had been adopted as the official religion of the Roman Empire, the church should be concerned with the mystical heavenly city (the New Jerusalem) rather than earthly politics. 37 He contrasted the material pleasures of the Earthly City with the eternal truths of the City of God.
38 He viewed human history as an engagement of universal warfare between God and the Devil. 39 He identified the Catholic Church with the City of God, and political and military powers aligned against it as the City of the Devil. 40 Similarly, in the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas articulated another version, with an emphasis on natural reason, natural theology, and natural law. 41 Aquinas differentiates among four kinds of law: eternal, natural, human, and divine. 42 Eternal law is the law of God as understood by God. 43 
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"participation" in the eternal law and is discovered through reason rather than revelation. 44 Natural law is based on first principles, including the first precept that good is to be done and evil avoided. 45 Human law is man-made law that is devised by human reason. 46 Divine law is God's law as it is revealed to humans in history in the form of divine commandments. 47 Divine law is divided by Aquinas into Old Law (e.g., the Ten Commandments) and New Law (i.e., the teachings of Jesus Christ). 48 We also see dualism in the idea of "two swords" articulated in the papal bull, Unam Sanctam, issued in 1302 by Pope Boniface VIII, with one sword being the "spiritual sword" controlled by the church and the other being the "temporal sword" controlled by the state. 49 A variation of this dualism is also found in Martin Luther's Two Kingdoms doctrine, which held that God rules the world in two ways: the "left-hand kingdom" through secular law and churchly government and the "right-hand kingdom," his spiritual kingdom, through the gospel and grace. 50 According to Luther, the earthly kingdom includes everything we can do and see in our bodies, including things done in the church. The heavenly kingdom includes only faith in Christ and is expressed in the slogans "Christ alone" and "faith alone." I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the Business of Civil Government from that of Religion, and to settle the just Bounds that lie between the one and the other. If this be not done, there can be no end put to the Controversies that will be 44 To the revolutionaries, the right to revolution arises when governments fail to respect this dualism; when the basic unalienable rights are not recognized and protected.
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The U.S. Constitution specifically addresses the state side of the dualist equation, although the first ten amendments (the Bill of Rights) were in all probability a condition precedent of getting enough states to ratify the Constitution for it to take effect. 57 The Free Exercise and Anti-Establishment provisions of the First Amendment reflect this dualism: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 58 The prohibition of a state church, as well as the guarantee of the free exercise of religion, reflected the dualist mindset of articulating limits to state power.
France
Even the French Revolution, which was much more secular in orientation and much more of a revolution against an established church than the American Revolution, 59 expressed itself in similar The representatives of the French people, organized as a National Assembly, believing that the ignorance, neglect, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole cause of public calamities and of the corruption of governments, have determined to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, unalienable, and sacred rights of man, in order that this declaration, being constantly before all the members of the Social body, shall remind them continually of their rights and duties . . . .
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Article 1 declares: "Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be founded only upon the general good." 61 Article 2 states: "The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression."
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Like the American Revolution, there is a powerful and pervasive dualism underlying the French Revolution. The rights declared are asserted to be "natural, unalienable, and sacred," things with which we human beings are born; and government is under a duty to protect these basic rights including freedom of religion, freedom of association, and freedom of speech. I find it interesting and noteworthy that Professor Novak acknowledged that many secularists dismiss this preamble language as a "sop" thrown to traditionalists. 70 He also agreed that only thirty years later it might be unlikely that such an acknowledgement of the limits upon and foundations of state power would be included if the Charter were being adopted today. My thesis-or worry, really-is that today we are engaged in an epochal struggle between monism and dualism; between statist ideologies that do not recognize any power above and beyond the state, and dualist ideologies that base state legitimacy in large measure on the extent to which the state respects rights that precede and do not depend upon the state for recognition. 
D. Human Rights
The challenges to dualism today come from both the Right and the Left.
Traditionalists (including some religious voices)
The challenges to dualism today come from a variety of places and people, including non-Western voices who assert that human rights are simply a Western invention and imposition. 77 These are typically the voices, not of the powerless, but of the powerful (typically those holding state power) who want to promote various nationalist or statist projects. 78 Increasingly, in an era noteworthy for religion-inspired terrorism, many of those voices are more specifically targeted at religious freedom itself. 
Progressive critiques (including some that are openly hostile to religion)
But there is a more specific and sustained attack on not only religion but also religious freedom by those who find religion (and The anti-terrorism law prohibits religious gatherings in nonregistered areas, which could reportedly include private homes. It also restricts promoting religion on the Internet. Missionary work or sharing faith without possessing certain documents to do so would lead to fines of up to the equivalent of $765 for a Russian citizen and up to $15,000 for an organization, while a foreign violator would be deported. Id.
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those who defend religion in the name of religious freedom) to be a backward and benighted obstacle to their progressive vision: an equalitarian society dominated by non-discrimination norms 80 never mind that those norms are also part of the universal human rights project. So, one progressive strategy is to promote these nondiscrimination norms to the exclusion of the freedom norms that also exist in human rights-not just freedom of religion, thought, conscience, and belief; but also freedom of speech, association, and assembly.
For example, in September 2016, in a report titled Peaceful Coexistence, the Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Martin R. Castro, called the phrases "religious freedom" and "religious liberty" "code words for discrimination, intolerance, racism, sexism, homophobia, Islamophobia, [and] Christian supremacy."
81 He said that "today, as in the past, religion is being used as both a weapon and a shield by those seeking to deny others equality."
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One of the report's principal findings was that "[r]eligious exemptions to the protections of civil rights based upon classifications such as race, color, national origin, sex, disability status, sexual orientation, and gender identity, when they are permissible, significantly infringe upon these civil rights." 83 Now, of course, it is not that religious freedom is never used rhetorically by racists, homophobes, Islamophobes, and Christian supremacists, but there is something startlingly reductive about simply equating religious freedom as some sort of secret code for discrimination. This is especially blinkered when so much of the discrimination that takes place around the world is discrimination against people on the basis of their religion, including contemporary genocides and 978 massive forced migrations. To say that religious freedom is primarily an idea in conflict with civil rights displays a degree of ignorance that can be described only as stunning and massive. But Castro's conceptualization of religious freedom and civil rights as being in conflict has become quite common. In the United States, for the past ten years or so, there has been a sustained and deliberate effort by the progressive Left to pit religious freedom against non-discrimination. This is largely a product of the struggle over gay rights in general and gay marriage in particular. In demanding complete social acceptance of gay marriage, any who oppose it on any grounds are quickly labeled as homophobic. 84 And any who would seek conscientious exemptions from participating in it, including religious groups, religiously-affiliated institutions (such as religious universities), religious business owners, government employees, and even religious employees of secular businesses are under tremendous pressure to be silent in all respects with any opposition to the sexual rights agenda. 85 Last year the issue was gay marriage; this year it is transgender rights.
As I try to understand the zeitgeist behind these efforts, it is apparent that the primary value is equality, the primary legal mechanism for achieving equality is non-discrimination laws, and the definition of discrimination rests on a kind of radical hedonic subjectivism.
The strong insistence on non-discrimination-and the wholesale rejection of accommodations or exemptions for those with conscientious objections to a legal mandate-reflects the attitude of monism. Accommodation becomes not an adjustment the state makes in the face of religious or other conscientious requirements but rather something the state demands from dissenters who are required to fall into line.
An insistence on a monistic view is illustrated in the opposition to Trinity Western University's decision to open a law school. The school requires students to sign a Community Covenant that, among other things, does not recognize same-sex marriage. 86 The Law Society of British Columbia decided not to approve the law school on the grounds that this was discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Court of Appeals in British Columbia sided with Trinity Western, declaring:
A society that does not admit of and accommodate differences cannot be a free and democratic society-one in which its citizens are free to think, to disagree, to debate and to challenge the accepted view without fear of reprisal. This case demonstrates that a well-intentioned majority acting in the name of tolerance and 86. The Trinity Western University Community Covenant states, in part: Members of the TWU community, therefore, commit themselves to: . . . .
• observe modesty, purity and appropriate intimacy in all relationships, reserve sexual expressions of intimacy for marriage, and within marriage take every reasonable step to resolve conflict and avoid divorce . . . . In keeping with biblical and TWU ideals, community members voluntarily abstain from the following actions:
• communication that is destructive to TWU community life and interpersonal relationships, including gossip, slander, vulgar/obscene language, and prejudice . . . .
• sexual intimacy that violates the sacredness of marriage between a man and a woman. Trinity W. Univ., Community Covenant Agreement, https://www8.twu.ca/studenthand book/twu-community-covenant-agreement.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2017). 980 liberalism, can, if unchecked, impose its views on the minority in a manner that is in itself intolerant and illiberal. 87 The Court of Appeals of Ontario, in contrast, sided with the Law Society, emphasizing the harm caused to LGBTQ people by Trinity Western's policy. 88 The case is likely destined for the Supreme Court of Canada.
IV. CONSCIENCE
I will only briefly address my third reason for thinking we should all care about religious freedom. Without FORB, there is no reliable basis for protecting and respecting conscience.
Recall that Article 1 of the UDHR identifies "reason and conscience" as two of the basic endowments that define us as human beings, and as the basis of human dignity.
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A. Official Ideology: Public Reason
If the official ideology of dualism is some variation of natural reason and natural rights (or perhaps Kantian deontology or social contract theory); the official ideology of monism is public reason, with its tendency to discount conscience-either significantly or altogether.
The assertion that public reason is hostile to conscience needs some explaining. Recall that the first public reason theorist was not John Rawls or even Immanuel Kant. It was Thomas Hobbes, and he was absolutely clear that the sovereign spoke in the voice of public reason and that subjects gave up their claims of conscience in exchange for the protection offered by the sovereign from the state of nature, where life is nasty, brutish, and short. The problem for those who value conscience is that it often speaks to us in registers that count paradigmatically as "private reason." Consider the metaphors we use for conscience-a prick of the heart, 92 a feeling in one's gut, 93 a powerful internal or even sometimes external voice that declares to us, "[H]ere I stand, I can [B] ecause the major part hath by consenting voices declared a sovereign, he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will, and therefore tacitly covenanted, to stand to what the major part should ordain: and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make protestation against any of their decrees, he does contrary to his covenant, and therefore unjustly. And whether he be of the congregation or not, and whether his consent be asked or not, he must either submit to their decrees or be left in the condition of war he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever. Reason must in all its undertakings subject itself to criticism; . . . Reason depends on this freedom for its very existence. For reason has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the agreement of free citizens, of whom each one must be permitted to express, without let or hindrance, his objections or even his veto.
Id.
Public reason is characteristic of a democratic people: it is the reason of its citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship. The subject of their reason is the good of the public: what the political conception of justice requires of society's basic structure of institutions, and of the purposes and ends they are to serve. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 213 (1993).
92. Ronda Parrish, The Blessings of Responding to a Prick of the Heart, ELEMENT3BLOG (Nov. 26, 2014), https://e360blog.wordpress.com/2014/11/26/the-blessings-of-respond ing-to-a-prick-of-the-heart-by-ronda-parrish/ (detailing an experience when a "prick of [the] heart" led a religious person to go on a service tour).
Samantha Olson, Your Gut Feeling Is Way More Than Just a Feeling:
The Science of Intuition, MED. DAILY (Mar. 12, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.medicaldaily.com/yourgut-feeling-way-more-just-feeling-science-intuition-325338 (discussing how intuition or conscience might literally manifest itself as a feeling in the gut). 982 do no other." 94 These are not public reasons; they are private reasons. And public reason is committed to the marginalization of private reason.
Consider the debate over religious exemptions-for doctors performing abortions, or public officials performing marriages. From a public-reason perspective, there is no good reason to provide an exemption. For a statist, the key consideration may be a value such as non-discrimination, which demands that everyone be treated equally, and no special treatment should be afforded to those with special or idiosyncratic religious or conscientious views. Arguments like these are familiar in statist systems. 95 It is true that public reason may claim to value religious freedom or claim to value conscience (perhaps based on an argument from the "original position"), 96 but we can also expect public reason to interpret religious freedom in a minimalist way. For example, Justice Scalia treats religious freedom in a dismissive fashion in Employment Division v. Smith, which prohibits laws that specifically target religion but permit those that burden religion, even severely, as long as they are "general" and "neutral" in character.
97 General and neutral laws are a classic public-reason formulation of the type of regulation that is legitimate, but as we learned from Smith, this does not result in a robust protection of either conscience or religion. the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)).
B. History of Protection of Conscience
It is important to remember that, as a historical matter, freedom of religion was the foundation of the broader recognition of freedom of conscience. The history of conscientious objection began with claims by organized religious communities such as Quakers, who had religious doctrinal objections to serving in the military. 98 Over time (several centuries actually), the protection of conscientious objection for those who belonged to religious groups was expanded to cover individuals with religious objections, even if their church did not itself have an institutional opposition to military service, 99 and then to those with claims when the government was unsure about whether their conscientious objection was religious or not, 100 
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eventually-by analogy-to those who were adamant that their basis for objecting to military service was not religious.
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The point is that it was not a general respect for conscience that led to conscientious protections of religious conscience, but the protection of religious conscience that led to a broader recognition of conscience as a fundamental human value.
C. From Gobitis to Barnette U.S. history offers cautionary tales about what happens when the values of uniformity are given priority over the value of conscience.
Consider the case of Jehovah's Witness children who objected to being compelled to pledge allegiance to the U.S. flag. In the late 1930s, at a time of national disunity, school boards began passing rules requiring all students to pledge allegiance to the flag. 102 One of these rules was adopted in Minersville, West Virginia. 103 The provision had been enacted specifically to coerce children who were Jehovah's Witnesses to salute the flag after they refused to participate in patriotic observances on conscientious grounds. 104 It was only after Lillian Gobitis (a seventh grader) and William Gobitis (a fifth grader) asserted religious reasons for not participating in the pledge that the school board in Minersville passed a resolution transforming the flag salute into a legal obligation. 105 Immediately thereafter, the school superintendent stood at a public meeting of the school board and dramatically expelled the Gobitis children for insubordination. 106 It was this "[s]tate action" that the Supreme Court would later uphold. 107 Writing for the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter declared: "Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs." 108 The Court held that the rule must apply to everyone because it was a neutral rule of general applicability. Ignoring the history of its enactment, the Supreme Court called the mandate "legislation of general scope not directed against doctrinal loyalties of particular sects."
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The Supreme Court's decision set off a wave of anti-Witness persecution that swept the country. 110 Hundreds of instances of vigilantism against Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to salute the flag were reported in just the week following the decision.
111 These included mob beatings, burning of Jehovah's Witnesses Kingdom Halls, and attacks on houses where Jehovah's Witnesses were believed to live. Two Witnesses were beaten in Sanford on June 8, 1940, when they refused to salute. The following day in Kennebunk, a carload of men conveniently equipped with throwing-size rocks "just happened to stop" in front of the Jehovah's Witness Kingdom Hall which doubled as the home of the company servant. The Witnesses, already jittery from a fortnight of tension, greeted the visitors with shotgun fire, seriously wounding one. Six Witnesses were arrested for attempted murder. In the meantime, an enraged mob of 2,500, failing to reach the prisoners, sacked and burned the Kingdom Hall, then drifted over to Biddeford to attack houses suspected of containing Witnesses. 115 Among other incidents, "the whole adult population of Litchfield, Illinois," gathered to attack sixty Jehovah's Witnesses; in Rawlins, Wyoming, a crowd led by the American Legion descended upon a trailer camp set up by Jehovah's Witnesses in preparation for a regional meeting and forced them across the state line; in Nebraska, a Witness "was lured from his house, abducted and castrated"; in Little Rock, Arkansas, armed workers from a federal pipeline project beat Witnesses, shooting two; in Klammath Falls, Oregon, a mob of a thousand townspeople stormed a Kingdom Hall.
116 These reactions are a cautionary tale of how far people will go to coerce uniformity when uniformity is viewed as being extremely important.
What is remarkable about this story is that only three years later, the U.S. Supreme Court did something that-believe me-it does not do very often: it said it was wrong.
The 988 1993, practitioners of the Santeria faith in Florida scored a victory for religious freedom when the Supreme Court found that ostensibly general and neutral city ordinances aimed at preventing that religion's traditional animal sacrifices were unconstitutional, and struck them down. 126 Five years later, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that a police department could not require two plaintiff policemen to shave their beards in violation of their Sunni Muslim faith, even though the requirement was supposedly general and neutral. 127 As these cases illustrate, not only can allegedly general and neutral laws have very different effects on different groups of people, but also the very claim that they are general and neutral at all is often highly suspect. In the current controversies over adoption agencies, same-sex marriage, and the HHS contraceptive mandates, it is very difficult to view as general and neutral the underlying rules that aim to change the behavior, if not the underlying attitudes.
Why do I recount this history of compelled patriotic observances and the road from Gobitis to Barnette? Because it illustrates how the idea that the values of unity and uniformity can be used to justify forcing those who disagree to go along with the prevailing view or else suffer severe consequences. What we learn from Barnette is that we do not have to force conformity. But public reason has no reason to respect conscience; public reason will demand that everyone be treated the same. 126 . Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525-30 (1993) (describing how city officials, concerned at the impending establishment of a church that practiced Santeria-including the ritual sacrifice of live animals-hurriedly adopted ordinances that forbade the killing of animals within city limits). Ostensibly, the ordinancesneutral and general in their language-were meant to protect the public morals, peace, and safety. Id. However, they included exceptions that effectively allowed any slaughter unless for religious reasons. Id. at 532-40. The presence of these exceptions led the court to conclude that the laws were not neutral or general, and failed under strict scrutiny. Id. at 542-47.
127. Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 360-61 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the city's requirement that on-duty police be cleanshaven was meant to promote an image that would help the police fulfill their duty). However, an exception existed for policemen with a dermatological condition that made shaving impractical. Id. at 365-67. The presence of a secular exception triggered heightened scrutiny, and the court found that as granting the religious exception would not undermine the aim of the requirement any more than the medical exception did, the requirement violated the Free Exercise Clause. Id.
V. CONCLUSION
Why Religious Freedom? Why should we care? If we care about human rights and human dignity, I do not believe these normative constructs can survive if we deny freedom of human beings to live according to the dictates of their conscience.
If we fear statism-monistic states that recognize no limits on their authority and view rights as gifts bestowed by the state (gifts that may also be taken back by the state)-then we need something like a dualist outlook, which differentiates between the sphere of state authority and other spheres of non-state authority. The intellectual resources for a dualist understanding of limited state power is rooted, historically and intellectually, in religious ways of viewing the world. Without religion, I'm not sure we have the intellectual, moral, or philosophical resources to resist the imperial logic of statism.
Finally, if we care about conscience, the existence of an inner feeling or voice that acts as a guide to the rightness and wrongness of our behavior, we must protect religious freedom. The justifications for the protection of conscience were first and foremost religious justifications, and if religious conscience does not receive protection, we should not expect other grounds for conscience being respected either.
